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What has happened to the quality of corporate bonds in the period
since the end of World War II? Has the risk in investing in these
bonds increased or lessened from the early postwar period to recent
years? How does their potential exposure to default and loss compare
now with the period of the 1920's? In these pages various facets of
quality are examined, following with some variation the tests developed
by W. Braddock Hickman in Corporate Bond Quality and Investor
Experiencefor the 1900—43 period.
Whereas Hickman's material was compiled from a thorough search
of all records of bond offerings plus year-by-year examination of the
financial statements of major American corporations, this study prin-
cipally drew upon investment service listings of public offerings and a
separate compilation of announcements of bond issues to be placed
directly with the ultimate holder (direct placements). Some findings of
other authors, including the excellent sample of direct placements
compiled by Avery Cohan for the period from 1951 through 1961, were
also utilized.2 Defaults were studied by compiling lists from the invest-
ment manuals as well as lists of corporations undergoing reorganization
under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act. Finally, to cover some points
not explicitly covered by Hickman, special tabulations were made of
the data for the earlier period, particularly the 1920's.
Two related qualifications of the present study should be noted.
First, in the absence of a major depression in the postwar period one
cannot be sure that measurements of selected characteristics and tabu-
lation of an admittedly minimal number of defaults give a true indica-
tion of how safe (or risky) the current increase of corporate bonds is,
particularly relative to previous bond issues that experienced a severe
economic test. Of coufse, it may be argued that with some advance in
1PrincetonUniversity Press for National Bureau of Economic Research, 1958.
2Furtheranalysis of the quality characteristics of direct placements is expected to
issue from Cohan's study, which is a part of the National Bureau's interest rate
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economic knowledge and a greater degree of recognition of govern-
mental responsibility for determining the course of the economy, reces-
sions in the future may be limited to roughly the amplitude and
duration of those experienced since World War II. Lacking here any
conclusive proof on this point, the reader should interpret the findings
on bond quality in the light of his own views about the likelihood that
recent recessions will be typical of the severity of the economic test that
the future will hold.
Second, in the absence of a substantial volume of actual defaults
(because, apparently, they did not occur), most of the analysis is based
upon so-called ex ante indicators of corporate bond quality, that is,
the presence or absence of characteristics found to have been associated
with default and loss in previous periods (for the most part, the 1900-43
period studied by Hickman). In this sense the postwar study of bond
quality seeks to measure risk exposure to a given situation rather than
to determine how many bonds currently outstanding can be expected
to go bad over their lifetime. That the data are less than perfect for
this task is obvious. On the other hand, standards of judgment of bond
quality have not gone through the revolution that has characterized
mortgage lending or consumer lending terms, nor have corporate bonds
shown the proliferation of forms that has generally characterized bank
loans to business. Indeed, the most conspicupus change, that of the
development of serial payment for direct placements, is thought by
some to be reassuring. While direct placements and convertibles have
played important roles in the corporate. bond field in the postwar
period, these forms of obligation have existed for many years. Stand-
ards for maturity and earnings coverage have been fixed for many
years also. Because no vast changes in corporate bond characteristics
have occurred, ex ante characteristics, that is, those previously found
to be associated with actual casualties, should not be misleading.
These are the findings of the study:
1. U.S. corporate bonds defaulting in the postwar period (from 1945
through 1965) averaged less than 0.1 per cent of the volume outstand-
ing, or about one-half billion dollars in all. This compares with 1.7 per
cent of the outstanding bonds which defaulted during 1900—43. The
postwar defaults were concentrated in bonds of the railroad industry,
many of which had been outstanding before 1920 or had been refund-
ings of original bonds issued prior to that year.Introduction and Summary 3
2. Defaults in the postwar period were not concentrated in a par-
ticular cycle phase, perhaps because recessions were not severe. Bonds
issued in the postwar period and defaulting from 1944 to 1965 were,
however, largely offered in years of business peaks or one year before
the cycle peak. From these facts we conclude that although bond
defaults have not been a significant problem in the postwar period,
the process whereby bonds are offered and some subsequently default
continues to be associated with business cycles.
3. Direct placements in the postwar period were much more impor-
tant than in the 1900—43 era. Because fewer data are available on these
bonds, determination of quality trends is more difficult than for public
offerings. Nevertheless, a search of available information indicated,
first, that defaults and losses were extremely sparse in the postwar
period; but second, that there occurred over the period a noticeable
drift of direct placements from extremely high-grade ca.tegories to
bonds merely considered acceptable as "investment grade." Similarly,
there was some increase in the proportion of direct placements consid-
ered below investment grade, although the proportion remained much
smaller than the corresponding figure for public issues.
4. As judged by agency ratings, public offerings have followed an
irregular trend in quality in the postwar period, but are superior to
those prior to World War II. Direct offerings are of better quality
than public offerings as measured by agency rating divisions into in-
vestment and subinvestment grades. For all corporate bonds, agency
ratings indicated higher quality and less irregularity in the postwar
than in the prewar period; however, by 1965 the proportion rated high
grade had drifted down to the 1943 level.
5. Agency ratings of public offerings are not consistently related to
postwar business cycles. In two cycles quality has a positive conformity
and in two an inverse conformity. Weakening in quality is seemingly
not related to the volume of bond offerings.
6. Quality of public offerings as measured by fixed-charge coverage
before taxes generally improved over the period 1900—46 and then
decreased. Since data for direct offerings are not available for 1944—50,
all that can be said is that the peak for all offerings occurred either in
the mid-forties or mid-fifties.
7. Direct placements generally had higher earnings coverage than
public offerings as a group because of differences in the industry mix.4 Trends in Corporate Bond Quality
Industrials, which form the majority of direct placements, usually
had higher coverage than utility and transportation issues. In each
major industry group, however, directly placed issues had lower cover-
age than public offerings.
8. Bond quality is sometimes measured by the difference between
market yield and a basic interest rate representing the return on essen-
tially risk-free investment. During most of the postwar period, the
quality of public offerings was better than in the prewar period in
that a larger proportion of issues was offered to yield less than 1 per
cent above the "basic yield." While quality as indicated by this
measure had slipped by the 1956—59 period to about the level of the
late 1920's, the drive for yield in the early 1960's apparently caused
most issues to be rated as high grade by this measure. This drive for
yield in recent years casts doubt on this means of measuring quality.
9. For virtually the entire postwar period the proportion of bond
offerings that were unsecured has been at or near record highs. This is
not considered to be a significant factor affecting quality, however.
10. During the postwar period, bonds convertible into stock have
frequently constituted 10 to 15 per cent of all bond issues. In neither
the prewar nor the postwar period have convertibles had as good
earnings-coverage as non-convertibles, and ratings by agencies have
indicated a substantial proportion of convertibles are of poor quality.
This judgment was generally confirmed by higher default rates among
convertibles in the prewar period, although not in the postwar period.
As measured by agency rating, convertible bonds have, moreover, ap-
parently fallen in quality from the early to the late postwar period.
Even after this brief listing of the major findings of the study, the
question again arises, Has the quality of credit deteriorated? The study
aims to answer this question, and examines many different statistical
series in the process. There are frequent contradictions in the data and
there are obvious cases where certain classes of bonds are substitutes
for others, so that partial analysis is likely to be misleading. To remedy
this, Charts 1 and 2 present the principal relevant statistical series on
the quality of corporate bonds.
Certain obvious conclusions follow from examination of these charts,
which show quality improvement over time as a rising trend and,
conversely, deterioration as a falling trend. The first is that quality,Introduction and Summary 5
CHART1
1. 1900—43: Hickman, Volume of Corporate Bond Financing, Table A-19 divided by
Table A..21; 1944—65: Table 21 of this study, new defaults divided by bonds in
good standing.
2. 1908—43: Hickman, Statistical Measures, Table 52; 1944—65: Tables B-I, B-2, and
B-3 of this study.
3. 1900-43: Computed from Hickman, Statistical Measures, Table 79;1951—61:
Combination of Table 24 of this study for public offerings and unpublished
data of Avery B. Cohan's for direct placements weighted by this study's industrial
and public utility (including transportation) direct placements. Hickman's data
are after-tax ratios and have been multiplied by a series of [actors computed
Measures of Corporate Bond Quality,
Public and Direct Offerings, 1900—65
Source6 Trends in Corporate Bond Quality
Source to Chart 1 (continued)
from Statistics of Income data on nonfinancial corporations to put them on a
before-tax basis. Data for direct placements are unavailable for 1944—50 and
after 1951.
4. 1900—43: Hickman, Statistical Measures, Table 70; 1944—65: Table E-1 of this
study (percentage of rated bonds only).
5. 1900-43: Hickman, Statistical Measures, Table 85;1944—65: Table D-1 of this
study.
CHART 2















Source: Lines 1 and 2 from Table 15 of this study; line 3 from
on Direct Placements, 1951—61," in preparation.
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by most of the cx ante measures used, has improved, and now stands
appreciably above the levels that prevailed from 1900 through the
mid-1930's. Likewise, although most of the measures have shown some
deterioration in the postwar period, all except those designated as
investment gTade were higher in 1965 than in 1943. The available
evidence suggests that both direct placement and public offering
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quality have deteriorated in the last few years analyzed (Chart 1).
An exception is times charges earned before taxes. This measure, which
combines public offerings and direct placements, has a gap for the
years 1944—50 and 1962—65 because earnings ratios are not available
in those years for the latter series. The fragmentary data suggest an
upward trend, possibly through the mid-forties or fifties, followed by
a downward drift.